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a question of supply and demand, 
the answer of polycentricism
Rutger Hagen and Christophe Crombez
1.  INTRODUCTION
Global commons refer to resource domains or areas that lie outside the 
physical or political reach of any one nation state, such as the Atmosphere 
or the High Seas. With a growing world population and the related chal-
lenges of pollution, food shortages and political tensions, these global 
commons are under pressure. Resources can also be harvested on a 
scale larger than ever before as a result of technological advancements. 
This makes many global commons vulnerable to over- consumption and 
degradation. Global collective action problems need to be tackled to avoid 
catastrophes. But what does (and should) such global governance look 
like? We will try to answer this question by regarding actors involved in 
such governance regimes, ranging from indigenous tribes to international 
organizations, as actors with a bounded rationality, vying to achieve results 
that reflect their preferences. Using rational choice theory we assume that 
these actors have their preferences in what global governance must supply, 
which in turn determines their demand of certain governance regimes. We 
underline that these preferences are not, necessarily, economically driven. 
An actor strives to maximize its preferences, but these preferences are not 
only about wealth and power but can encompass many other aspects, such 
as improving the quality of life or the environment. This expansion of a 
primarily economic concept builds further on the work of Elinor Ostrom 
(1999), in which she recognized the rationality of involved actors but was 
critical of thin models of rational choice and the supposed inability of 
actors to govern a commons collectively. Such collective governance can 
create a system that is able to protect the resources in a commons, enabling 
participants to create higher pay- offs than when individuals do not organ-
ize. In his famous article ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Garrett Hardin 
(1968), building on the work of Coase (1960), did not believe rational 
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actors could move beyond their short- term interests. In his view, individu-
als would seek to maximize their short- term profits even if  it would lead 
to the degradation of a commons. Actors would display such behaviour 
since the individual would assume the other users would follow the same 
rationale and exhibiting self- restraint would have no substantial effect on 
the well- being of the commons. This would lead to a tragedy of collective 
overuse. We distance ourselves from that pessimistic view and believe 
that the forming and workings of governance of global commons can be 
explained with a bounded rational choice approach. Actors are influenced 
by their past experiences and norms and trust, reputation and reciprocity 
when we allow for actors to have longer time- horizons. Communication 
and information sharing are crucial in understanding how collective action 
is achieved on a global level. In this chapter, we will look deeper into the 
dynamics that may give rational actors incentive to pursue long- term 
strategies and try to explain their political behaviour. We do this by laying 
bare social mechanisms that occur in strategic interactions, thus building 
a behavioural foundation for collective action on global governance for 
global commons.
The puzzle of  what global governance exactly is and how it functions 
has intrigued many scholars. A vast literature exists on international 
cooperation, but much of it is fragmented and focused only on specific 
arrangements. In this chapter we will try to link together many of the 
insights of  these studies, while focusing on global commons governance. 
This focus is motivated by our observation of the deepening common 
action problems global commons encounter. Unlike international govern-
ance systems such as the European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) that can give direct benefits to its participants 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Koenig- Archibugi, 2004), the direct benefits of 
good global commons governance are less obvious. One reason for this 
is that global commons are large (world- spanning) and complicated to 
monitor. The participants of  global commons governance regimes and the 
actors who have direct interests in these commons are very diverse and not 
necessarily the same, which can result in severe collective action problems. 
According to many scholars, there is also a large discrepancy between, 
on the one hand, the vital ingredients of  successful governance, such 
as monitoring and sanctioning, and on the other, current international 
global commons governance regimes where those elements appear absent. 
In this chapter we will expose the challenges global commons governance 
encounters and present the reader with the prerequisites we believe are 
needed to achieve successful management of the global commons. We 
take the next step, and move on from understanding governance regimes 
as separate independent entities and approach the governance of global 
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commons as linked to many other governance regimes in a polycentric 
setting. The linkage between these regimes provides us with a convincing 
explanation on how collective action problems on a global scale can be 
overcome.
We start this chapter by reviewing the lessons learned in the study of 
local commons and their applicability to global commons governance. 
With these lessons in mind, the central part of  this chapter (Sections 3 
and 4) is divided into two sections: demand and supply. There we will 
discuss how and by whom the demand for global governance and institu-
tion formation can be voiced. We continue by discussing the products 
a successful global governance system must supply. To achieve and 
maintain a governance system is costly for its members. Participating in 
such a system does not come for free and, thus, the perceived benefits of 
participation must outweigh the perceived costs. Otherwise, the demand 
and support for the system will dissipate and a governance system is not 
viable. When demand and supply of  governance is matched in a satisfying 
fashion, global commons can be successfully managed and protected from 
degradation. We mirror our arguments using the micro- economic model 
of  supply and demand. In such a model the demand for a particular good 
will equal the supply, resulting in an equilibrium (Coston, 1998). We 
argue that governance and, in particular, the governance of  a commons, 
can be seen as a public good, and in the case of  global commons as a 
global public good (GPG). The defining characteristics of  a public good 
are that it is non- excludable and non- rival (Samuelson, 1954). In other 
words, no one can be excluded from it and the good does not diminish 
when it is used. A public good is, thus, a term for a broad range of  goods 
and services that can have an effect on everyone. Since a governance 
regime applies to all subjects and actors under its jurisdiction, it makes it 
non- excludable since no actor can be barred from it. It is also, to a large 
degree, non- rival since the governance system and the products it provides, 
such as courts or monitoring systems, do not diminish when an extra actor 
uses/consumes it (see Figure 6.1 for a representation of the classic distinc-
tion of goods based on the characteristics of  excludability and rivalry or 
subtractability).
In our final section we bring the demand and supply side together and 
discuss institutional arrangements needed in doing so. We argue that 
interconnectedness and overlapping of several governance regimes can 
be a solution for the observed collective action problems. We disagree 
that polycentricism is solely problematic as it can lead to inefficient, 
opaque and undemocratic governance (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). 
Interconnectedness of regimes also enables us to create a setting whereby 
actors can be given a fair representation and where sufficient monitoring 
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and sanctioning systems are in place, when this is not possible in a single 
global all- encompassing arrangement.
2.  FROM LOCAL TO GLOBAL COMMONS
In this section, we revisit the lessons learned in some of the fundamental 
literature on the (local) commons. We then attempt to apply these lessons 
on global governance systems and consider how global governance can 
incorporate them. As we will see, global commons share some charac-
teristics with commons on a local level, but differ from them in some 
crucial aspects. Determining the differences and similarities helps us in 
establishing the characteristics of the supply and demand for governance 
of commons on a global scale.
The first studies on commons focused on physical areas producing 
common pool resources (CPRs). This concept of collectively owned goods 
stems from economic theory, most notably from the works of Samuelson 
(1954), Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965). They were the first to distin-
guish specific goods, based on characteristics of rivalry and excludability. 
When a good has non- excludable and rivalrous characteristics, it is labelled 
a CPR. An individual unit of a CPR can only be appropriated by an 
individual user, making the system sustainable if  the rate of replenishment 
is higher or equal to the rate of withdrawal. When withdrawal exceeds the 
replenishment rate, the CPR declines and the commons deteriorates. These 
characteristics lead to collective action problems described by Hardin 
(1968). In his seminal article entitled ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, he 
outlined a bleak future for the commons where these CPRs can be found. 
Although in his article he does not distinguish between open access and 
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Figure 6.1  Classic economical representation of different types of goods
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communal property (Ciriacy- Wantrup and Bishop, 1975), his ‘Tragedy of 
the Commons’ is still a good starting point to explain over- exploitation in 
a commonly owned territory on a local, but also on a global, level.
In Hardin’s view, economically rational users of a commons do not take 
the negative externalities of their actions into account, but will solely try 
to increase their own utility. Such users make demands on a resource until 
the expected benefits of his or her actions equal his or her expected costs, 
and because each user ignores costs imposed on others, individual decisions 
cumulate to a tragic overuse and the potential destruction of an open- access 
commons. Hardin partly based his article on the concept of maximum 
sustainable yield, developed by Gordon and Schaefer in the 1950s (Gordon, 
1954). They managed to calculate the maximum yield point after which 
resources will decline. Hardin’s proposed solution of preventing this over- 
consumption was either instating public regulation or privatization of free 
enterprise. In his view, rational users do not have a demand for a govern-
ance scheme because they are not willing to let an authority curb their 
own exploitation of it. Users of a commons, in that view, are trapped in a 
situation they cannot change themselves. External authorities are then the 
only way out. But this disregards the fact that both government ownership 
and privatization are themselves subject to failure as well, in part because 
the direct link between demand for governance and governance itself  is lost.
One of the strongest critics of Hardin’s theorem was Elinor Ostrom 
(1990; 1996; 1999), who received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 
for her work on the analysis of economic governance of the commons. 
Ostrom (1990) proved that when communities manage CPRs themselves, 
a commons can thrive. When a community takes control, the demand 
and supply for governance are directly linked and this helps to overcome 
Hardin’s disempowering and pessimistic vision of the human prospect. 
The recognition of her work stimulated many more researchers to study the 
underlying mechanisms that shape the governance of CPRs. Research has 
shown that even as early as in the Middle Ages, plots of land or pastures 
were commonly owned and had communal institutions supplying rules 
and regulations to its users. These commons were able to be extensively 
cultivated while remaining common property (Zückert, 2003; De Moor, 
2011). However, while local commons have a history of being able to 
function well, the broadening of the governance principles from these local 
commons to a global scale has, as we will see later, proven dissatisfactory.
Overcoming collective action problems is germane to governing any 
commons successfully. Global commons, however, differ widely from local 
commons because they are domains that have cultural and/or natural 
resources on an international, supranational or global scale and can also 
be degraded on a large scale affecting millions (or even billions) of actors. 
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There is much debate on what intrinsically distinguishes a commons from 
other property regimes, since it can encompass anything that is commonly 
owned (De Moor, 2011). Dardot and Laval (2014) argue that a common 
can be virtually anything; not bound by intrinsic features, but is defined 
based upon the mode of governance administered (see Dardot, Chapter 
2 in this volume). Historically, from a juridical viewpoint there are only 
a couple of commons on a global scale: the High Seas, the Atmosphere, 
Antarctica and Outer Space. The conception of these areas have been 
guided by the principle of the common heritage of  humankind –  the open 
access doctrine or the mare liberum (free sea for all). That these areas 
were historically designated as global commons is no coincidence, as the 
resources found there were, at least at the time of their establishment, 
either especially hard to appropriate, or so abundant that restricting access 
or striving for exclusive control was not economically justified (Wijkman, 
1982). Next to these four classic global commons, other domains can also 
be considered as global commons, even under international law. This can 
be the case when an area is viewed as of global concern. These areas are 
usually not under an international regime but are subject to national juris-
dictions. Examples are rainforests or national waters (Costanza, 1999). 
The Internet (or cyberspace) can be considered a global commons and has 
a complicated multi- layered governance system (Hess and Ostrom, 2003; 
2007). Global commons are thus widely diverse in nature and can supply 
goods behaving as CPRs or even public goods (De Moor, 2011: p. 430).
While research on local commons focused on CPRs, global commons 
can have very different characteristics. The Internet, for example, does not 
behave as a commons in Hardin’s Tragedy because, even though it is hard 
to exclude people from using it, the resources it produces (knowledge) are 
not reduced when consumed. It can even be argued that in consumption, 
the resource grows since information can actually be added by its users, 
as Figure 6.2 illustrates. It is clear that commons that have a low degree 
of rivalry do not need to be protected from over- exploitation. In these 
cases, the resources in the commons do not exhibit the characteristics of 
a CPR but that of a public good and the main problem associated with 
public goods is under- provision. And this is indeed what we witness in 
these commons that have resources that are non- subtractable. Many users 
access, use and share information at the same time, leading to the existence 
of a shared resource or a knowledge commons. The demand for informa-
tion is extremely high but information can be restricted due to reasons 
such as limited access, bandwidth limitations or copyright issues. In a 
commons that produces such non- subtractable (or public) goods, a certain 
governance regime is also demanded by its users, but the prerequisites and 
set up would be very different to that of a commons producing CPRs. It is 
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clear that the traditional framework of maximum sustainable yields is not 
well applicable for such an instance, and we are in need of a new paradigm.
Global commons, however diverse their nature, are intrinsically difficult 
to manage. They transcend the scale of a town, region or even a single 
country and some of these resources can only become effectively depleted 
or made available in an international context. Resources in such vast areas 
are also more difficult to measure and monitor or require measurement 
with advanced and costly technology. Some global commons, such as the 
global climate, are largely self- healing in response to a broad range of 
human actions, until these actions exceed a certain threshold (Broecker, 
1997: p. 1582) making it hard to predict the eventual outcome of a certain 
level of use. The enormous scale of global commons, and the complica-
tions that this entails, makes it impossible for small, relatively unorganized 
societies to efficiently manage these resources and match demand and 
supply for governance. A governance system must be formed by a coop-
eration of the appropriate international, national and local institutions. 
Ostrom et al. (1999) sum up the six main challenges in creating these global 
governance structures:
 ● ‘Scaling up problems’: When many participants are involved in man-
aging a CPR, it is increasingly difficult for the members to organize 
and to reach agreements on rules and their enforcement.
 ● ‘Culture diversity challenge’: Finding shared interests and under-
standings can become more difficult when there is a wide cultural 
diversity of participants.
 ● ‘Complications of interlinked CPRs’: Since the world is getting more 
and more interconnected and interdependent it will become increas-
ingly difficult to manage resources in an adherent fashion.
 ● ‘Accelerating rates of change’: Population growth, economic devel-
opment, capital and labour mobility, together with technological 
change pose new challenges on our learning ability.
Rivalry in global commons
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Figure 6.2  Typological positioning of global commons on an indicatory 
rivalry scale
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 ● ‘Requirement of unanimous agreement as a collective-choice rule’: 
Since most governance schemes concerning global resources are 
negotiated treaties with a voluntary assent, governments can hold 
out for special privileges before they join. This strongly affects the 
policies that can be adopted.
 ● ‘We have only one globe with which to experiment’: With a local 
commons, it is possible to move on to better pastures when a tragedy 
occurs, but with global commons there is no such escape clause.
The challenges identified are indeed problematic in creating successful 
global governance structures. Basic premises, such as face- to- face com-
munication, which helps to increase joint gains and improve defection 
rates (Ostrom et al., 1992; 1994), are much harder, or even impossible, to 
accomplish on a global scale, but still remain important alongside auton-
omy to establish rules duties and an allocation of rights (Walker, 2000). 
Global commons with more heterogeneous sets of participants are more 
difficult to govern and have a greater tendency to deteriorate (Keohane 
and Ostrom, 1994). It is far more challenging to develop trust among 
participants that do not share common understandings. It is also more 
problematic to reach agreements and to monitor and impose sanctions 
(Choucri, 1993). On a global scale, the heterogeneity of interests grows 
exponentially with different political ideologies, culture and economies 
that pose challenges that must be taken into account. A governance regime 
should overcome the existing heterogeneity through good institutional 
design (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). However, because of the large and 
complicated interconnectivity of our actions, it is hard to recognize their 
exact consequences. This ambiguity shrouds the true interests and inten-
tions of actors even from themselves, since the outcome resulting from 
actions taken is, to a high degree, unknown and uncertain. Consumers, 
for instance, cannot observe the degradation that is occurring because of 
their purchases. Since they are not aware of the true consequences of their 
behaviour their pay- offs are unknown and they will not have an incentive 
to change their behaviour. Corporations, while they can observe the deg-
radation, have little to no incentive to inform their clientele. Such actors 
have a strong incentive to focus on short- term interests and disregard the 
ecological degradation (Stern, 2011). Creating governance regimes that 
can protect these resources is, as we have discussed, very difficult. But aside 
from facing organizational difficulties, these processes are also under time 
pressure. The timeframe for achieving good governance systems is limited. 
For many natural global commons the resources are non- renewable in 
a human lifetime. Carbon dioxide emissions for instance can affect the 
global climate for the next 1,000 years (Weber and Stern, 2011) – meaning 
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that in many cases action has to be undertaken now to prevent catastrophe 
in the near and not so near future.
It is difficult for individual actors to comprehend the significance of 
global commons and what the actual need for cooperation and govern-
ance is. Yet, understanding of these aspects is crucial for resources to be 
managed successfully. The true demand for governance on a global level 
is extremely hard to unravel and this complicates assessing whether the 
supply of governance is  just –  even more so because of the interactions 
between global commons and the complexity of existing governance 
schemes. The following section will focus on the actors who are considered 
to be the owners of a global commons and who can find themselves voicing 
demands for its governance. We will look into the underlying demand for 
governance and try to determine how demand can manifest itself, leading 
to the formation of new institutions.
3.  DEMAND FOR GLOBAL COMMONS 
GOVERNANCE
When resources are commonly owned, collective action problems typically 
emerge. Under- investment in maintenance and overuse, for example, can 
damage the resources, depleting benefits for other users. CPRs are also 
susceptible to free riders, which can be seen as the most typical example 
of a collective action problem. Free riders shirk costs of maintenance 
and access, leaving others to bear them. Free riding occurs particularly 
when a resource is widely available to a large population (Russett and 
Sullivan, 1971). Since rational individual actors would prefer not to fall 
under a restrictive governance regime themselves (so they can continue 
to free ride), the demand for such a regime is not straightforward. Yet, 
authoritative structures capable of supplying sufficient investment in the 
maintenance of common resources, as well as supplying or restricting 
equal access to users, are needed to prevent the deterioration of a (global) 
commons (Dietz et al., 2003). Users of a commons will, thus, have to 
step over their own restrictive personal rationale and be prepared to work 
with the other users, in order to reach a self- sustaining commons and so 
increase the collective pay- off. This, however, remains difficult.
As mentioned, collective action problems arise when ‘personal interest’ 
of a user, or player, is not aligned with ‘group interest’. This leads to 
outcomes with inefficient Pareto Nash equilibria (Kollock, 1998). The 
prisoner’s dilemma, assurance and playing chicken, are all basic games 
that can be applied to the governing of global commons (Ward, 1993). 
These 2 3 2 games show some of the fundamental dilemmas when dealing 
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with collective action, as when collaboration is absent, an inefficient 
equilibrium is achieved instead of a Pareto- optimal one. In these games, 
alternative outcomes, whereby the pay- off  for the entire collective is higher, 
without reducing the pay- offs of the other players, are possible. But that 
outcome cannot be reached because there is no cooperation due to the 
actions of the players who act solely egocentrically. A certain incentive is 
needed to move beyond this self- defeating behaviour and governance can 
be the vehicle that supplies the players with this.
We have already argued that a governance regime for a global commons 
can be seen as non- excludable and, to a degree, non- rivalrous, so it can be 
viewed as a GPG. The amount of protection that is provided by a govern-
ance regime can be enjoyed by all. This non- excludability can lead to 
under- provision because actors will want to lower their own contributions 
for such a regime and so will be unwilling to show their true demand. The 
costs for a governance system must be borne by the participants, while 
non- participants will receive the benefits as well. It is therefore attractive 
for actors not to participate but let others pay for the protection. The true 
demand for the good will, thus, be higher than is visible (Hirshleifer, 1983).
When actors have a self- interest to deviate from actions that serve the 
common interest, it is shown that repeated games help conformance to the 
rules (for example, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). In a single game, it is not 
possible to be punished later on, so self- interest prevails. When the same 
game is being played over and over, the players can adapt their strategy 
to each other, making deviation from the common interest unattractive. 
Defectors can then be punished in later stages. These interactions enable 
those who use reciprocity to gain a reputation for trustworthiness, and 
others in turn will be willing to cooperate with them (Nowak and Sigmund, 
1992).
Reciprocity and trust are, thus, very important to rule confirma-
tion and  the development of  norms. Modern technology, such as the 
Internet  and the media, enable large groups to monitor one another’s 
behaviour and coordinate activities in order to solve collective action 
problems. Although evolved norms are not always sufficient to prevent 
deterioration of a commons, they play a crucial part when constructed 
by the participants themselves (Ostrom, 1999). These rules must then be 
monitored and enforced. These rules define, for example, who can enter a 
commons, use it and, if  so, how much.
The production of any good is only viable if  actors are indeed willing 
to bear the costs of producing it. They will only do so if  the perceived 
benefits (direct and/or indirect) are at least equal to the perceived costs. 
Establishing and maintaining a governance system is costly and includes 
costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcement of the rules. Coasian 
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theory suggests that when these costs are too high, the creation of an 
efficient regime that can govern the resources is unlikely (Coase, 1960). 
When the resource is large and complex, users will also lack a common 
understanding of the dynamics of the resource (Ostrom et al., 1999). Such 
a caveat makes the perceived benefits hard to observe, while the costs are 
much more certain. This will make potential participants of a governance 
regime more hesitant in joining.
In our next section we will examine who the governance demanding 
parties, or the users and managers of a global commons, might be. The 
subsequent step is to discuss how these parties might be able to overcome 
collective action problems and form a new institution to govern the global 
commons.
3.1  Participants of a Governance Regime
A demand for a governance system must typically come from the manag-
ers, or users, of a commons. Although a global commons would typically 
be owned by all, it is beneficial here to define ownership more closely. 
The concept of ownership in relation to the commons has puzzled many 
scholars. This is for a large part the case because for a long time it was 
assumed that when a person did not have the right to sell the property 
(alienation rights), such individual would not have any property rights at 
all (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Since a commons typically cannot be sold 
by anyone, this led to the unsatisfactory concept of commons being a place 
with resources without any ownership at all. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
moved away from seeing ownership as a single undividable concept and 
built further on the work of John Rogers Commons (1924), who defined 
ownership as a bundle of rights that are divisible, separable and alienable.
The bundle of rights as defined by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) consists 
of the right to:
 ● have access to the resource;
 ● appropriate the resource;
 ● manage the resource;
 ● exclude others from using the resource and how that right might be 
transferred;
 ● sell the management and exclusion rights.
These property regimes are independent and can be combined in multiple 
ways so the diverse nature of a commons is correctly  displayed –  although 
many theorists discarded the possibility of efficient management of 
resources without the right of alienation. Schlager and Ostrom (ibid.) 
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criticize this by showing that efficient management is possible when the 
four other rights are well defined.
It is hard to apply these rights directly to global commons. Not only 
because we cannot truly speak of ownership of a global commons, since 
when it is subject to the common heritage principle they cannot be appro-
priated or be subject to sovereignty claims. But also because the actors 
with property rights are found across the globe, and are therefore often 
unable (or unwilling) to come and participate in accomplishing a shared 
governance system. This is true for the natural, but also for the knowledge 
commons. The Internet, for instance, is subject to diverse national laws and 
legislations that differ widely from country to country. Another important 
difference with local commons is the absence of a clear community. In 
international relations, individual people are not the main participating 
actors. They are (for a large part) represented by governments, intergovern-
mental organizations, corporations and non- governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (Stern, 2011). Because not all users and managers of a global 
commons can be included in its governance, the costs will be shared 
disproportionally. The actors that do participate must bear all costs, which 
in turn makes the reaching of the break- even- point (the moment where 
the costs equal the benefits) more difficult, thus leading to increased 
under- provision.
Our assessment that most users and managers of a global commons 
cannot execute their bundle of ownership rights directly by participating in 
a governance system may seem pessimistic and discouraging. It is, however, 
the first indication that a governance scheme of a global commons cannot 
be truly understood when it is studied as existing in a presumed vacuum 
without links to other (more local) governance systems. A governance 
system that governs (part) of a global commons is, in fact, in connection 
with many other governance schemes. This interconnectedness ensures 
that owners of a global commons that are not well represented in a certain 
governance scheme can still have influence (albeit indirectly) when they are 
represented in another. Such polycentric governance can not only give us a 
way out of the representation dilemma, it can also help us in solving many 
collective action problems, an aspect we will now turn to.
3.2  Institution Formation
We have showed that the formation of a governance system for a global 
commons is not straightforward. These difficulties are primarily caused 
by the fact that global commons deal, and are ‘owned’ by, a multitude 
of actors. The number of actors alone can pose a challenge in institution 
formation, but so can their size and diversity. Actors involved in global 
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commons range from individuals to international organizations and 
everything in between. This poses extra challenges, but also opportunities, 
for efficient and effective governance. Many authors do not include this 
premise in their analysis but implicitly accept the constrictive framework 
set by Hardin (1968), where a central authority is necessary to effectively 
manage collective resources (Stern, 2011). This is a major departure 
of Ostrom’s contribution in promoting collective self- governance and 
institutional design. A central authority on a global scale is also not in 
accordance with what we observe in contemporary global governance. In 
many instances, multiple governments have worked together in protecting 
the global commons (Haas et al., 1993; Tietenberg, 2002; Young, 2002). 
Also international NGOs play a major part in these governance regimes 
(Prakash and Potoski, 2006). Such regimes are thus very complex, and can 
differ widely from one instance to another. Due to the size and complexity 
of global commons, it is apparent that their governance should be able 
to deal with changing circumstances. Dietz et al. (2003) present us with 
some requirements for adaptive governance systems. Next to a trustworthy 
provision of information on resource stocks, flows and processes, and in 
addition to interactions with the environment and a system that deals with 
solving conflicts that arise between actors and the inducement of compli-
ance to rules through formal and informal mechanisms, they find that a 
physical and technological institutional infrastructure, which is adaptive, is 
necessary to handle complex systems.
To arrange the infrastructure for an adaptive governance regime is 
costly, and its costs must be borne by the participants. We have already 
argued why participants would prefer to free ride while others form the 
institution. If  all actors would behave this way, a governance regime would 
not be formed. Such a formation can be seen as a second- order free- rider 
problem and applies to any mechanism that solves the first- order free- rider 
problem, of actors not following rules. Theoretical and empirical analyses 
indicate that institution formation can, even so, be an important and effec-
tive solution in social dilemma situations (Kosfeld et al., 2009).
Despite the second- order free- rider problem, the institution formation 
process can be structured in such a manner that the implementation of a 
sanctioning organization is supported by a Nash equilibrium. When each 
player earns a higher pay- off  than in the status quo equilibrium (where no 
players contribute to the public good), an organization can be implemented 
by only a subset of players. This subset takes for granted free riders that do 
not contribute. Experimental results of Kosfeld (ibid.), however, show the 
crucial role of fairness in such an institution formation process. Individuals 
are very reluctant to comply with a sanctioning system that governs only 
a subset of individuals. This is true even if  the subset of individuals can 
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earn a higher material pay- off  than in the status quo with no sanctioning 
system, thus making the implementation of the system optimal, at least 
from a material standpoint. Buchanan and Congleton (1998) use this argu-
ment to propose the so- called generality principle as a normative guideline 
for political action. The principle asserts that political choices should be 
general in nature, that is, non- discriminatory and based on equal treatment 
of all individuals. They, thus, impose upon it yet another hurdle in achiev-
ing successful governance regimes for global commons.
We have argued that actors have an incentive to hide their true prefer-
ences, in order to free ride on the efforts of others. This premise suggests 
that the level of protection or management of global commons, whether 
they produce CPRs or public goods (such as knowledge), will be lower than 
the true aggregated demand, which can lead to degradation of a commons. 
Establishing a governance regime is made more difficult because of the 
lack of transparency and the complexity that global commons inherently 
entail. Governance regimes that are established will not be able to accom-
modate all the owners of a global commons because of the sheer numbers 
of actors who can claim partial ownership. Studies have also shown, 
however, that individuals are less likely to implement a system when it only 
applies to a subset, as opposed to the entire collective. These observations 
all reinforce our main argument that a successful global governance regime 
must be linked to others, in order to achieve a more universal coverage 
with more information about the individual actors and the status of the 
global commons. On a smaller scale, for instance within local communities, 
institution formation can be achieved more easily. When these systems 
work together, a global commons might be managed successfully. But what 
is successful governance exactly; what must it supply? This is something we 
will discuss in the following section.
4.  SUPPLY OF GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL 
COMMONS
The puzzle of how to achieve collective action lies at the core of the 
challenges global commons face. When collective action fails, a commons 
deteriorates. As we discussed, global commons have widely different 
characteristics. Some produce resources that are highly rivalrous in nature, 
such as fish in the oceans, while others do not produce any goods at 
all. Antarctica is the prime example here. While it does harbour natural 
resources, the harsh environmental conditions make almost any economic 
activity unviable, at least at the time the agreement came into force in 1961. 
Governance schemes in place focus instead on protecting the area from any 
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negative externalities that can harm the environment or endanger peace, 
such as military and economic activities in its direct vicinity (Wijkman, 
1982). This governance regime, thus, restricts access. Knowledge commons, 
such as the Internet, require different governance schemes, since the 
knowledge they produce does not diminish when consumed and so shares 
commonalities with a public good. Successful governance schemes here 
should supply measures that ensure the accessibility of the commons and 
limit negative externalities that emanate from this. Examples of such nega-
tive externalities are the usage of the Internet to facilitate illegal activities 
such as terrorism or child abuse. We will first discuss the main ingredients 
a governance regime can supply us  with –  transparency, monitoring and 
 sanctioning –  after which we will look at more concrete measures a govern-
ance regime for a global commons can take.
4.1  Transparency, Monitoring and Sanctioning
Governance can only function if  there is a certain degree of transparency. 
The actions of an actor must be known, to a certain degree, to others. If  
one cannot observe the actions of other actors and ascertain when a rule 
is breached, it is also not possible to sanction or punish the defector. This 
makes monitoring and sanctioning the two key concepts a governance 
system must supply. How this should be achieved in governing commons 
has been discussed by Weissing and Ostrom (1991). They argue that moni-
toring should not be directly carried out by the actors themselves, since 
there is always a temptation to deviate from rules and obligations, and this 
does not exclude monitoring activities. Special independent monitoring 
actors can sufficiently restrain the participants. A regime should, thus, be 
able to function relatively independently from its users if  it is to supply 
adequate governance. Only with such independence is it possible to reach 
an equilibrium without perfect cooperation.
Next to monitoring, a successful governance regime should also be able 
to issue sanctions. Formal and informal sanctions include: fines, restric-
tions, peer pressure, gossip and social ostracism. All these instruments are 
an encouragement for actors to exhibit group- oriented behaviour (Blau, 
1964). Experiments indicate that a formal sanctioning system can increase 
contributions (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Masclet et al. (2003) also show 
that, in addition to a formal system of monetary fines, the sanctioning 
system is a vehicle to express disapproval of decisions by others and, thus, 
functions as an informal system as well. Punishment can be a powerful 
form of communication because it serves as a warning that in the future 
the player will have a lower pay- off  if  things do not change. It has also been 
shown that direct punishment of non- co- operators can cause a rise in the 
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level of the average contribution to the system and co- operators are even 
prepared to pay a cost for punishing (‘altruistic punishment’) (Milinski et 
al., 2002).
Many CPR regimes around the world rely on sanctions, and there is 
almost unanimous agreement in the literature that an effective sanction-
ing system is a major determinant of the success of such regimes (see, 
for instance, Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1999). Examples in 
the international arena are the EU Stability and Growth Pact (Buti et 
al., 2003), which was created to enforce budgetary discipline among EU 
member states, or the World Trade Organization (WTO), which regulates 
international trade by implementing legally binding agreements (Barton et 
al., 2008). These institutional arrangements are not imposed from without, 
by an external actor, but are formed from within in the sense that, at some 
point in time, a set of agents voluntarily agreed to implement this kind 
of arrangement. In this situation, two different types of subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria exist: a so- called organizational equilibrium, where players 
successfully implement an organization, and a so- called status quo equilib-
rium, where no organization is implemented. A sanctioning system in itself  
is often not enough to ensure that participants fully conform to the rules. 
In the Stability and Growth Pact, large countries such as Germany and 
France managed to escape fines on multiple occasions, and the financial 
crisis of 2008 has highlighted that the monitoring system implemented 
was inadequate in finding discrepancies in the Greek financial reports. In 
many instances, it becomes apparent that the eventual sanctioning system 
in place is not adequate and cannot produce the desired results. In some 
cases, it is lacking all together (Börzel and Risse, 2005). Empirical studies 
also find that monitoring and sanctioning are not central in international 
negotiations. This is remarkable, since if  a sanctioning system were impor-
tant, the negotiating parties would put a lot of emphasis on it (Kennan 
and Wilson, 1989). Apparently the demand or need for these instruments 
is not as prevalent as one would expect. An explanation for this absence is 
given by Coleman (1990), who states that shared behaviour is vital when 
members of a group have individual incentives to take actions that reduce 
the overall welfare of the group. Nevertheless, most authors do assume that 
norms should be backed up by implicit or explicit sanctions that penalize 
deviations from acceptable behaviour (Homans, 1961).
4.2  Measures and Barriers
We have taken a closer look into the scientific discourse on governance 
and the roles transparency, monitoring and sanctioning play. We then dis-
cussed the difficulties in achieving these elements in realizing a  governance 
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regime for something as large and complex as a global commons. We will 
now consider actions a governance regime of a global commons can take 
to protect it from degradation. For natural global commons harbouring 
CPRs, trade barriers of any kind need to be implemented and enforced. 
Otherwise the users of such a commons will extract more resources than 
can be replenished (Gordon, 1954). These barriers can either help to 
reduce the demand for the goods in a commons, or make it less attrac-
tive or impossible to (over)exploit them. Conventional trade barriers 
are tariffs and quotas and they are regularly used in protecting (global) 
commons. An environmental tariff  on imports or exports can be used to 
increase the costs of purchasing a product. This higher cost will lower the 
demand for these items. These measures can be instated when resource 
extraction or the production process causes natural degradation. These 
external costs are then borne by the consumers. This can be used to fight 
eco- dumping and prevent an ecological race to the bottom. Non- tariff  
measures (NTMs) are all policies affecting trade, other than tariffs, and 
can prove to be very effective to curb natural common degradation. They 
often reduce welfare and distort trade flows; however, since we do not have 
a perfect market without externalities and information asymmetries, the 
instruments are highly valuable in a non- perfect market (Van Tongeren 
and Marette, 2009). The prime example of NTMs are quotas. Quotas put 
a direct limit on the amount of resources available to consumers and are 
used in areas such as fisheries and the emission of greenhouse gases. The 
advantage of using a quota in comparison to a tariff  is that it is clear from 
the start how many resources exactly can be extracted from a commons 
(Kraus, 2013). For a quota system to be incentive- feasible it must be imple-
mentable by a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, meaning that players need to 
have conditional beliefs about the other players at every information set 
and define a strategy accordingly to maximize their pay- off. In the case 
of a global commons, each country (or other manager of the resource), 
after updating its beliefs by observing the resource consumption over the 
previous period, chooses its own rate of consumption for the following 
period. Since the destruction of a global commons would be disastrous for 
all, participants would be able to agree on a punishment system. In such 
an equilibrium the quota system can be dynamically self- enforcing (Haurie 
et al., 2008; Harrison and Lagunoff, 2017). Such a system would require 
a certain degree of transparency and enforceability. We have already 
established that due to the size and complexity of global commons, they 
are very vulnerable to externalities and information asymmetry, making 
effective monitoring difficult.
NTMs were traditionally applied for protectionist purposes but are now 
also being introduced by policy makers to address market imperfections 
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and so help facilitate trade. In order to strengthen assurances of safety 
and quality, for instance, standards and regulations can be implemented. 
Certification is helpful to signal to consumers whether they are acquiring 
sustainable products. Forest certification has proven to lower demand for 
unsustainable wood, and is therefore a good incentive for corporations 
to engage in sound environmental practices (McDermott and Cashore, 
2009). NTMs can, thus, facilitate trade since reputation and certification 
increases trust, while quality standards help reputation (Blind et al., 
2013). Also transparency provisions can facilitate regulated trade flows 
(Lejárraga et al., 2013). Such measures, nonetheless, receive their fair share 
of criticism. Because it is expensive to meet such standards, more so for 
foreign suppliers than for domestic, it can reduce market access for foreign 
producers. This is contentious especially in North- South trade (Jaffee and 
Henson, 2005).
Global commons with CPRs thus need protection from over- exploitation. 
Knowledge commons, however, must be governed quite differently, since 
their resources are non- rival. Instead of limiting access, governance systems 
here must focus on combating under- provision. Although, as stated above, 
information is in essence non- rival, the existence of copyrights and patents 
enables actors to invoke exclusivity. Governance regimes must balance this 
exclusivity of private information with promotion of access to information 
because:
Properly linked, private property can enhance the value and importance of the 
commons, and vice- versa. Thus there  is –  or should  be –  an important place 
for both commons and property in Internet governance, and it is unwise to 
emphasize one to the exclusion of the other. Indeed, the very structure of the 
Internet, which combines exclusive, private network facilities and services with 
open, nonproprietary standards, is a prime example of this interdependence. 
(Mueller, 2007: p. 24)
Private property can range from patents to personal pictures or infor-
mation on web browsing behaviour. This information should not be 
considered public. A governance system must, thus, be able to protect these 
personal interests because otherwise the commons will degrade, while, on 
the other hand, open access should be stimulated so public information 
can be exchanged more freely.
The measures a global commons governance system must supply differ. 
Executing tariffs, quotas and quality standards can suffice to protect 
natural global CPR commons. However, often economic interests prevail 
when governing bodies must choose between them or combating, for 
instance, pollution (Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993). And the adverse results of 
climate change are felt more with each passing year. Promoting the sharing 
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of information, while combating negative externalities that occur when 
private or illegal information is accessible by limiting and restricting access 
to those types can make information commons thrive. While Internet laws 
are now in place, their execution is hampered by physical barriers and 
legislative frontiers. Hacking and identity theft are becoming more preva-
lent (Taylor et al., 2014). Thus on the one hand, governance regimes do 
not supply us with enough restrictive measures so the exploitation of our 
physical natural resources can be lowered to acceptable levels. While on the 
other, the protection of information is lacking and criminal organizations 
or malicious governments seem to be able to regularly obtain and misuse 
private information. More restrictions on information are not the sole 
answer, however. Over- protection of information can cause problems, since 
it can lead to underuse of scientific resources when intellectual property 
rights are too strict (Heller, 1998). The classical solution to these problems, 
that is, the instalment (Hardin, 1968) of a single all- encompassing govern-
ance regime that can weigh all interests and has universal applicability, 
is not only unfeasible given the very diverse interests of the many actors 
involved in the creation of such an institution; it is also no true solution, 
since global commons are too large and complex to be managed by a single 
behemoth- regulator. We believe polycentricism is the solution for this 
conundrum, since it can be inclusive, diverse and adaptive to handle large 
complex systems. We will discuss polycentric governance in more detail in 
the following section.
5.  POLYCENTRIC ORGANIZATION OF A 
SUCCESSFUL GOVERNANCE REGIME
Collective action problems were typically presented as simple 2 3 2 games. 
We argue that this classical approach, which prevails throughout the litera-
ture, starting with Stein (1982) and Snidal (1985), is unable to capture the 
complicated reality of global commons governance and that a new para-
digm has to be developed that links governance regimes to one another.
A governance system of a global commons must have a functioning 
monitoring system of the resources it contains. In this respect, it is not 
important whether the resources are rivalrous (such as fish or mineral 
deposits) or non- rivalrous (such as knowledge). Governance must also 
supply us with rules and regulations to avoid degradation of the global 
commons. The system must monitor the actors that use the resources of 
the commons and must be able to punish defectors of the rules. McGinnis 
and Ostrom (1996) made an overview of institutional arrangements that, 
in theory, could be used in international regimes that govern commons. 
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This classification includes governmental, intergovernmental, corporate 
and NGO- actors. These actors can either be monitoring the resource or 
sanctioning the defectors. This can happen in different configurations. A 
government can, for instance, fine a corporation when it is observed that it 
violated a law. NGOs can play a significant role in monitoring corporations 
and governments. Defecting governments can then be punished by fellow 
governments. McGinnis and Ostrom recognize that there are no powerful 
external authorities that can enforce agreements. The absence of an exter-
nal authority means that voluntary assent by countries to negotiated trea-
ties is the standard collective- choice rule for global resource management 
(Wiener, 1999). This voluntary assent allows some national governments to 
insist upon special privileges before they join the governance system, thus 
strongly affecting the kinds of resource management policies that can be 
adopted at this level, as they lack universal coverage. In local commons, 
this is not really an issue, since there is always the state and the rule of 
law that can help keep violators in check. Although international law of 
course exists (see Brunnée, Chapter 13 in this volume), there is no true 
active enforcement regime (Koh, 1997). Sanctioning must, therefore, come 
from the participants themselves, since the participants of the regime in 
principle will want to do so. Otherwise they would not have agreed that a 
global commons is worth protecting. They may, however, be tempted to act 
as free riders and try to break the rules themselves. Participants will also be 
hesitant to pay for monitoring and punishment.
When sanctioning only applies to members of the institution, non- 
members remain free in their choices and, hence, following public good 
logic, are given a strong incentive to free ride (Kosfeld et al., 2009). 
Everyone, thus, profits if  an institution is formed, but each individual 
profits more if  others form, and bear the costs for, that institution. If  all 
participants followed that logic no institution at all would be formed, and 
everyone would be worse off. This is what can be termed a ‘dilemma of 
endogenous institution formation’. A possible solution is proposed by Haas 
(1980), who advocates the linkage of issue- areas, so players can adapt their 
behaviour in one arena based on what happens in another policy area. This 
can help coerce players to conform to the set rules, because even if  it is not 
possible to sanction someone in one governance scheme it might be possi-
ble in another. Since most research focuses on only one governance regime, 
the influence of linkage has been mostly disregarded (Contandriopoulos et 
al., 2010). We argue that the concept of linkage is crucial in understanding 
global governance and how monitoring and sanctioning can truly be sup-
plied. Considering only single governance arrangements has led to many 
false assumptions on how sanctions and monitoring are not important 
because they are not instated on a sufficient level or fail to be executed 
COGOLATI_9781788118507_t.indd   121 16/11/2018   16:26
Rutger Hagen and Christophe Crombez - 9781788118514
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 01/03/2019 12:12:58PM
via Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
122 The commons and a new global governance
properly. As discussed, global commons are so large and complicated that 
monitoring is difficult. We also discussed the diffuse users and managers of 
a global commons. It cannot be said that countries are the only managers 
and/or users of a global commons but that they share this with a plethora 
of other actors such as indigenous communities, NGOs or even ordinary 
citizens. Instead of creating a Gordian knot that cannot be unravelled, we 
believe the combination of a complex problem with complex management 
can be a solution for our governance conundrum. We argue that a good 
mix of actors in a global commons governance regime can ensure a better 
estimation of the demand for governance and can also provide a successful 
monitoring and sanctioning system. Actors will only be willing to invest 
in monitoring when the (perceived) benefits outweigh the costs. These 
benefits are, on a global scale,  uncertain –  but on a local scale much more 
apparent. For instance, indigenous communities, or NGOs that are active 
on the ground, witness climate degradation on a daily basis. Their costs 
for monitoring are low, while possible benefits for well- executed govern-
ance are very apparent. It is key that they are able to communicate (and 
convince) other owners of the need for governance measures. When other 
global actors can be made aware of the degradation, their involvement can 
lead to successful governance. Informed citizens all over the world can then 
punish polluters themselves (by boycotting products from certain compa-
nies or countries) or by inducing their governments to do so (by voting for 
certain parties or demonstrating for policy change). When citizens demand 
action, costs for punishment by country governments can be compensated 
by electoral support.
When local actors and global communities interact, they can create a 
powerful mix. Such a governance regime will not be monocentric. Local 
actors can only be involved in a small piece of the puzzle. But these 
pieces are interconnected, enabling the linkage between different regimes. 
Linkage also makes rule conformance possible when this might not be 
likely in isolated instances. Because countries and other actors in global 
governance participate in several social games simultaneously, the interac-
tion or linkage of these games provides a sophisticated way by which trust 
is gained and collective action problems can be overcome. In global gov-
ernance indirect reciprocity, that is, ‘give and you shall receive’, is built on 
reputation that can be gained in the multiple international policy arenas. 
Indirect reputation can sustain a high level of cooperation. The need to 
maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity can help ensure cooperation at 
a surprisingly high level (Milinski et al., 2002).
Linkage helps us to understand why punishment regimes in a single 
governance scheme may seem to be inadequate. The more complex a 
commons is, the more challenging it is to craft a well- tailored set of institu-
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tional arrangements that can protect a global commons from degradation. 
Through polycentric governance, or in other words multiple governing 
authorities operating on different scales, the complexities can be matched 
and rules and regulations can become more flexible (Nagendra and Ostrom, 
2012). It also enables punishment regimes to become more effective. Actors 
will be hesitant to break a rule when they may be punished in any number 
of other policy arenas, or are hampered in their actions on the world stage 
because they no longer enjoy the trust of the other participants. This line 
of reasoning implies that actors who participate in many policy arenas at 
once and who are, thus, vulnerable to sanctions on multiple levels, will be 
more inclined to follow the rules, while actors who are fairly isolationist 
can disregard more easily international sanctions for the governance 
regimes of which they are a part. Also the size of actors matters. Large and 
economically strong actors are able to withstand the backlash they receive 
from breaking the rules or as a result of their unwillingness to participate 
in a certain governance scheme. Strong actors are also able to compensate 
participants for the damages or coerce them and so hamper the monitor 
and sanction functions. The results that are found in diverse theoretical 
models (see, for instance, Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Baliga and Maskin, 
2003; Dutta and Radner, 2006; 2009; Harrison and Lagunoff, 2017) point 
towards polycentric governance, whereby different types of actors shape 
the monitoring and sanctioning system, as being most effective in govern-
ing global commons. A mix of organizations is important, since exclusive 
monitoring responsibility provides a strong incentive for bribery and cor-
ruption. Collusion must also be avoided since it would likely result in poor 
rule enforcement (McGinnis and Ostrom, 1996). Large power imbalances 
can also severely obstruct governance regimes from successfully protecting 
global commons. These imbalances may be countered when such groups 
can keep each other in check, as consumers versus multinationals, voters 
versus governments, or multinationals versus cyber- terrorists. A further 
complication is that the effective implementation of formal polycentricism 
must rely on clear boundaries, but global commons sometimes require 
approaches that are not always geographically or legally coterminous 
(Andereis and Janssen, 2013). This has as its result that a polycentric 
system in a global commons setting will have to remain informal and, to 
some degree, ambiguous. Nonetheless, polycentric governance with linked 
governance regimes gives us a convincing explanation of how a successful 
global commons governance is formed. When diverse interests are accom-
modated these are able to better estimate the demand for governance. At 
the same time, monitoring and sanctioning is facilitated because of the 
increased number of countries and organizations involved that are able 
to execute them. It is a comforting thought that, although our global 
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commons are under increasing strain, our modern ways of communication 
make the world smaller, allowing us to link demand and supply for govern-
ance on a global scale more effectively than ever before.
6.  CONCLUSION
We have assumed that actors involved in global commons are participants 
with a bounded rationality striving to maximize their preferences. The 
size and complexity of global commons prevent actors from achieving 
successful collective action in single, world- spanning, governance systems. 
In this chapter, we have approached the governance of global commons 
as a GPG, because governance supplies us with non- excludable rules and 
regulations, while being non- rivalrous in nature. Looking through a public 
good lens, we can use the economic adage of demand and supply to better 
understand what kind of collective action problems exist in global govern-
ance and how they may be solved. It becomes intuitively apparent that 
global governance is at risk of being under- provided, which can lead to 
the degradation of global commons. A successful governance regime must 
lead to a perceived benefit for the participating actors that is higher than 
the perceived costs. But governance on such a level is costly and inefficient 
while the direct benefits to the participants are unclear.
Monitoring and sanctioning devices are crucial for any governance 
system to succeed, but they are difficult to construct when actors on a 
global level typically can choose whether to participate or not. In smaller 
settings with fewer participants or a limited policy scope, institution forma-
tion is easier. When actors know each other better, trust between them is 
improved and monitoring and sanctioning are more effective. With a small 
policy scope, uncertainty is low and transparency high. When these local 
arrangements are transposed to the global level many of these virtues are 
lost. We believe that the solution for successful global governance lies not 
in simply copying local arrangements but in linking local initiatives to gov-
ernance regimes on regional and global levels. Such polycentric governance 
regimes can best handle the complexities of a global commons. Linkage of 
governance regimes enables the reputation of actors to cross over and so 
act as a deterrent for free- rider behaviour, since rule breaking in one policy 
arena can lead to repercussions in many other arenas. By harnessing the 
knowledge of local actors, the true demand for governance can be better 
estimated while the costs for monitoring a global commons can decrease 
since there are local observers. But local actors cannot achieve a successful 
global commons governance regime by themselves. The involvement of 
global actors can, next to the execution of coordinative activities, help 
COGOLATI_9781788118507_t.indd   124 16/11/2018   16:26
Rutger Hagen and Christophe Crombez - 9781788118514
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 01/03/2019 12:12:58PM
via Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
 Governance of the global commons 125
divide costs between many actors, thus reducing the risks of participation. 
Paradoxically, while some modern developments put our global commons 
under pressure, our modern communication methods can help generate 
polycentric governance systems to protect them.
We have provided the reader with some of the building blocks for creat-
ing and developing successful governance regimes for global commons. 
Empirical research on polycentricism and linkages between governance 
regimes on an international level is still far behind on what we have learned 
already on a local level. Our hope is that the theoretical framework we 
have presented can lead to a better understanding of what our common 
responsibilities are and how we can protect on a global scale the shared 
resources we hold dear.
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